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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
HlRMl G. HILL, JR., 
ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER, 
and DONALDS. COHEN 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs 
v. Civil Action 
No. 3-76-48 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 
Defendant 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY'S RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFFS' 1'10TION FOR COSTS 
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
STATEMENT 
On June 18, 1979, plaintiffs moved this Court, pur-
suant to 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1976) (section ll(g)(4) of the 
Endangered Species Act), to award them attorneys' fees and other 
•I 
I l li itigation costs. This. request comes some 28 months after this 
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Court, on February 24~ 1977, 'issued its final order permanently 
enjoining the completion of the Tellico Reservoir, pursuant to 
the Sixth Circuit's mandate, and over a year after the Supreme 
' Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's ruling on June 15, 1978 (437 
u.s. 153). 
A brief chronology of proceedings in the case, as· 
related to plaintiffs' claimed award, would, we feel, be help-
11 
been amended to request them. On February 26, 1976, this Court 
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11 :: heard and denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. 
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Following a 3-day trial in April,the action was dismissed on 
May 25, 1976. This Court's judgmen.t was then appealed to the 
Sixth Circuit. The appeal was heard on the merits on October 
14, 1976, and decided in plaintiffs' favor by the Sixth Circuit 
on January 31, 1977. The Sixth Circuit's mandate CI.Wa:tded plain-
tiffs only $50 in costs for their filing fee on the appeal. No 
other costs on appeal were awarded.·. The plaintiffs filed no 
cost bill and sought no award of attorney~' fees. Thereafter, 
pursuant to the Sixth Circuit's mandate, this Court on February 
24, 1977, issued a final order permanently enjoining closure of 
the dam and destruction or modification of the snail darter's 
critical habitat. That order contained no provision for 
attorneys' fees or costs, and no request for them was then made. 
The Supreme Court grantE;!d TVA's petition for writ of 
certiorari on November 14, 1977, and, following argument on 
Apri 1 18, affirmed the Sixth Circuit's judgment on June 15, 
1978. The Supreme Court's judgment which was issued June 17, 
1978, did. not award any costs to plaintiffs, nor did they seek 
attorneys' fees or other costs from that court. 
Plaintiffs have thus waited some 28 months after this 
Court issued its final order complying with the Sixth Circuit's 
mandate and let more than a yeat go by since the Supreme Court's 
affirmance of that decision. ' It is TVA's position that their 
belc3;ted request is untimely and improperly seeks an award from 
this Court of costs and fees which should have been sought from 
the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court. Furthermore, even if 
this Court should decide to award fees and expenses, based on 
appropriate criteria, the $24,595.53 award sought is excessive. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
The Requested Fees and Costs 
Cannot Be Recovered. 
" i Unlike the situation between private parties, the 
'f allowance of litigation costs against the. Government is the 
exception, rather than the rule. Such costs may be imposed 
!i il ''only to the extent permitted by law. 11 Rule 54(d}, Fed. R. Civ. 
II 
II 
:I 
'I I, 
,, 
" I! :f 
II 
•I 
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976). Moreover, even among 
private litigants, allowance of attorney's fees is uncommon. 
Such fees are generally allowed only if expressly provided by 
statute or under one of the limited exceptions to the judicial 
I II rule disallowing them. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness 
'· Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. 
il 11 Haier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967). 
II 
:! 
As against the 
\i 
j\ 
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:t 
Government, attorneys' ;fees may only be-allowed as 11 specifically 
provided by statute." 28 U.S.C. § 2412.; Cassata v. Federal Sav. 
'I ;i 
:: & Loan Ins. Corp. , 445 F. 2d 122 (7th Cir. 1971). 
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Endangered Species Act does provide for such fees, it is TVA's 
view that, except for those incurred in proceedings before this 
Court, the fees sought by plaintiffs are neither appropriate 
nor reasonable under the statt1te and' cannot be recovered. 
Section ll(g)(4) of the Endangered Species Act governs 
the timeliness of plaintiffs 1 request. That section, which 
grants the court discretion to make an award~ provides: 
II 
ll 1 Rule 54(d) states: ii uEx<::ept when express provision therefor is made either in 
1
1;,·.· a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall 
be allo\.;red as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
1! court otherwise directs; but costs against the United States, 
!i its officers, and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
!i permitted by law. Costs may be taxed by the clerk on one day's 
il notice. On motion served within .5 days thereafter, the action 
!! of the clerk may be reviewed by the court.'' 
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The court, in issuing any final order in any suit 
brought pursuant to paragraph (1} of this subsection, 
may award co~ts of litigation (including reasonable 
attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, when-
ever the court determines2such award is appropriate [16 u.s.c. § 1540(g)(4)]. 
it 
1 We have not found a case construing the meanin.g of the statutory 
II 
II 
I' 
.I 
term 11 in issuing any final order." Its reasonable and natural 
II 
:! import, however, would be to require the prevailing. party to il 
!t 
I! submit its request for attorney's fees before the entry of the 
., 
il final judgment, or at least promptly thereafter. Here, the 
l1 li complaint did not demand attorneys' fees; it was never amended 
il to do so; and the question of fees was never even raised by 
'i 
'I 
il plaintiffs in the appellate court. Cf. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. 
:i 
lj Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 378 F.2d 62, 69 (9th Cir. 1967). Further, 
;; ~ as already noted, it has been some 28 months since this Court 
1: "issu [ ed its] final order" in this suit, an order which awarded 
:I 
:i no costs or attorneys' fees. And it has been over one full year 
ij 
i; since the Supreme Court, which also awarded no costs, terminated· !; 
this litigation. 
It is well settled that a right to recover costs which 
ii 
ii depends upon statute or court rule is lost by failure to seek 
it 
'I i! costs within the time prescribed. ~, 20 C. J. S. Costs § 27 5 
ij 1
1 (1940); Woods Constr. Co. v. Atlas Chern. Indus. , Inc. , 337 F. 2d 
i! 
II 888 (lOth Cir. 1964) (3 months' dela,Y after judgment was fina~, 
!! 6 months' after entry); Dickinson Supply, Inc. v. Montana-Dakota 
lj ~ Utils. Co., 423 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1970) (17 days after entry of 
j; judgment); Kallay v. Community Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 52 F.R.D. 
!I 
Ji 139 (N.D. Okla. 1971) (15 days after entry of judgment). 
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Moreover, any claim to relief which plaintiffs might 
have pursued to alter this Court's .order to provide for attor-
.neys' fees, or to have it amended because of mistake or 
2 Emphasis addedunless otherw{se noted. 
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!1 excusable neglect in not claiming them, is similarly barred. 
li 
tl 
I! 
!I 
postjudgment motion seeking such :fees, if; q.s here, they were 
not claimed previously, is subject to Rule 59(e), Fed. R. Civ. 
'I 
ll 
·I 
il 
jl 
P., and must be served. within 10 days after entry of the judg-
A. 
i·; 
il ment. Stacy v. Williams, 446 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1971); Fase v. 
I 
li Seafarers Welfare & Pension Plan, 79 F .R.D. 363, 366-67 
li ii (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 589 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1978). 
,I 
:: If a motion seeks relief under Rule 60 (b) because of mistake, 
:( 
\1 inadvertence, or excusable neglect, it must be made "within a 
;i reasonable time," and never more than a year after judgment. 
I)" 
'I E.g., Ackermann v.· United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197 (1950); 
!i 
:1 Sunfire Coal Co. v. UMW, 335 F.2d 958, 962 (6th Cir. 1964), 
.i 
!1 cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1965); Gulf Coast Bldg. & Supply Co. 
v. International Bhd. Elec. Workers, 460 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 
1972). The rule applicable here is succinctly stated in 11 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2866, at 233 
(1973): '1 [l]f the appeal should result in a substantive change 
in the judgment the time would run from the entry of the new 
:j 
d judgment entered on mandate of the appellate court." ,, Here, over 
:j 
!i 
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/I 
IJ 
i) 
il l! !I 
two years have elapsed since the Court entered its "new judgment 
. on.mandate," and over one year since the Supreme Court's 
affirmance, and no reasons at all have been given for the delay 
. ' 
in seeking relief. 
Moreover, plaintiffs' claims for appellate printing 
costs, and fees, are contrary to the mandates of the appellate 
Ji courts issued in this case.· We have already mentioned that 
J! 
I! plaintiffs did not claim these items in either of those courts, 
:t 
!i and neither court awarded them, as their attached mandates show. 
I j: 
1'. This Court thus cannot do so. The Supreme Court made this clear 
I! 
·, 
i: in Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R., 334 U.S. 304 .(1948), The dis-
trict court's final judgment had added prejudgment interest to 
1: a jury 1 s verdict, when the appellate court's mandate had made 
,, 
ii 
11 
I' 
5 
it 
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l; 
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!j )t 
1[ no provision for interest. 
I! 
-On: appeal to the court of appeals, 
'I 
l! 
I! 
i! 
the interest provision was str~cken out, and the Supreme Court 
11 affirmed, stating: ll 
It is clear that the interest was in excess of the 
terms of the mandate and hence was wrongly included in 
.the District Court's judgment and rightly stricken out 
by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The latter court's 
mandate made no provision for such interest and the 
trial court had no power to enter judgment for an 
amount different than directed. . . . 
. . . That [the mandate} made no provision for inter.-
est was apparent on its face. Plaintiff ~ccepted its 
advantages and brings her case to this Court, not on 
the proposition that amendment of the mandate has been 
improperly refused, but on the ground that the mandate 
should be disregarded. Such a position cannot be 
sustained [at 306-07]. il ~ This principle applies to attorney's fee claims: 
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[W]hen we affirmed the .final judgment this put an end 
to the litigation and the district court had no 
authority to reopen the case for the consideration of 
attorney fees or any other purpose [DuBuit v. Harwell 
Enterprises, Inc., 540 f.2d 690, 693 (4th Cir. 1976)]. 
Accord, Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 569 F.2d 
1294, 1297 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, u.s. , 58 L. 
Ed. 2d. 320 (1978) (Supreme ColJrt mandate); Skeoch v. Ottley, 
278 F. Supp. 314, 316 (D.V.I. 19~8). See also Globe Indem. Co. 
v. Puget Sound Co., 154 F.2d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 1946) (costs). 3 
. The claim for appellate printing costs is even more II 
Under both the Supreme Court's Rules and the Federal II unfounded. 
l Rules of Appellate Procedure, printing costs taxable in those 
11 courts are to be determined and taxed by the clerks . of those 
I! courts, not this Court. Sup. Ct. R. 57(6); R. 39(c), (d), Fed .. 
I 
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R. App, P. The Supreme Court's failure .to·award the.printing 
costs which plaintiffs now .claim here (cost bill, item 2) is 
easily explainable--by the express terms of Supreme Court Rule 
3 Where a statute mandates recovery of attorney 1 s fees as a ~.:'I; part of recoverable damages, as in the antitrust laws (15 U.S. C. 
11 § 15 (1976)), a different rule applies. Perkins V. Standard Oil , li Co., 399 U.S. 222 (1970). The statute here, of course, reqpires · 
Jl an express finding that attorney's fees would be "appropriate." ,, 
d 
Ji 
IJ 
I! li 
·' ,, 
h 
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'i 
ij 
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II 57(3), "The cost of printing briefs [and] motions .. is not 
I' 
II 
II 
il il 
a taxa.ble item."·. As to Sixth Circuit printing costs, plaintiffs' 
failure to claim them within the 14 days expressly provided by 
Rule 39{c) barred their award by the clerk. Denofre v. 
!i 
t· ii Transportation Ins. Rating Bureau, 560 F. 2d 859 (7th Cir. 1977); 
n 
·' 
'I I; Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 587 F. 2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 
i! 
i! 1978). 
If 
An additional 28 months' delay certainly cannot revive 
l1 them here. 
'I 
i! I, 
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i' [I !I 
lj 
i{ 
ij 
,, 
!j 
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Only Reasonabl 1e Legal Fees and Costs Actually 
Incurred Can Be Recovered. 
If r~coverable at all, the fees and costs should be 
jl reduced, under the statutory standard that permits the district 
ii court to award "costs of litigation (including reasonable 
II 
ti attorney and expert witness fees) . whenever the court 
i 
;: determines such award is appropriate. '1 The award of such fees 
,, 
11 
!I 
· is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Farmer ~: It 
·I 
H v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U;S. 227 (1964); National Transformer 
!J 
jj Corp. v. France Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 343, 362 (6th Cir. 1954); 
II 
!1 Harrington v. Texaco, Inc. , 339 F. 2d 814, 822 (5th Cir. 1964), 
l
lji cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965); 10 Wright & Miller, Federal 
j Practice and Procedure § 2668 (1973f. 
In determining what is a reasonable fee, the court is 
!J 
!i not bound by the attorney's statement of hours spent; or the fee 
II !! which he might charge his own private client. See Marr v. Rife, 
'j 545 F.2d 554, 555·56 (6th Cir. 1976); Carter v. Montgomery Ward 
I 
'! & .Co., 76 F.R.D. 565, 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); .Clark v. American 
il 
!1 Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 
tl 
i! 
i! 
d 
'I II 
1: 
11 
i 1: 
'I j, ii I· li 
I ~I 
I 
l 
I 
I, 
I, 
437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971); Morehead v. Lewis, 432 F. Supp. 
674, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Redtictions in fee claims are not 
uncommon. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit stated .in Marr v. Rife, 
-- ~
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I' 
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l 
!i 
il 
;f 
II 
ii 
!! 
II II I. _?upra, upholding the trial court's reduction of a requested fee II 
II ,, 
) ~ 
'I I; 
il 
I' 
i\ 
li ,. 
it 
Ji 
II 
by ov~r 50 percent: 
We do not understand the trial judge to be limited in 
his award by statements or evidence offered by counsel, 
but. rather the jud e ma make an ihde endent determina~ 
tion of the proper expenditure o time t at is reason-
ably necessary for the preparation and presentation 
of the particular case [545 F.2d at 555-56]. 
li 
li The Fifth Circuit has similarly pointed out that the trial court ~ i ); 
:r 
!' d 
lj 
:J 
L 
!I 
... is itself an .expert on the question and may 
consider its own knowled e and ex erience concerning 
reasona e an proper ees an may orm an independent judgment either with or without the aid of testimony 
of witnesses as to value [Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 
143~ 144 (5th Cir. 1940)]. · 
I! 
i il Accord, ~' Horehead v. Lewis, supra; McCormick v. At tala Cty. 
d 
H :, 
il 
!/ 
ti 
:I 
rl 
fl 
,I 
\l 
':I 
Bd. of Educ., 424 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 n.5 (N.D. Miss. 1976); 
Central Soya Co. v. Cox Towing Corp., 431 F. Supp. 502, 505 
(N.D. Miss. 1977). This .special position and expertise is 
expressly recognized by the Endangered Species Act, which dele-
gates to the trial court the determination of whether.and how 
il much of an award is "appropriate" in light of the facts and 
H ,, 
d 
circumstances of each case (16 u.s.c~ § 1540(g)(4)). ! ~ 
'I II 
ij 
Among the criteria which courts have adopted to guide 
il 
!I 
the determination of attorney's fee awards are the factors 
established for fee setting by Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the 
,) 
11 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. 
H 
'j I, 
Waters v. Wisconsin 
fi 
!1 
II 
II I; 
il 
I' i! 
II 
!l 
'I !l 
1: 
I li 
1: 
ii 
II r: 
li 
II 
\I 
'· II 
ij 
li 
il 
ij 
1: 
Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., ~02 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425.U.S. 997 (1976). This case was 
cited with approval in Singer v. Mahoning County Bd. of Mental 
Retardation, 519 F.2d 748, 749 (6th Cir. 1975), and similar 
guidelines have been adopted by other courts. Johnson v. 
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 
197 4) . See also Carter v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra. 
Taxable attorney's fees, however, are not set on the 
basis of what the market will bear. Only reasonable attorney's 
fees may be .allowed. It must al~o.be borne in mind that the fee 
8 
ti I; 
II here is not a negotiated contr~ctual one, but one imposed upon 
I' 
.I 
Ji an involuntary client. As stated by the court in NRDC v. EPA, 
I' 
,! li 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973): 
ii 
p 
ti 
:t 
I• ll 
II 
I' :f 
~ I I 1\ 
·' i! 
I! ll 
Ji 
il 
II 
li 
ll 
i! 
'! 
We will scrutinize carefully the requested costs and 
fees .. Petitioners are not a public agency and are 
legally responsible to no. one but themselves; we must 
satisf 7 ourselves that>the tax a ers' mone will not 
be use to support nee . ess or excessive ega items. 
We must also recognize that petitioners, as surrogate 
attorneys for the interests of the public and the EPA, 
have volunteered and 11 imposed" their services on 
"clients" that never contracted for them~ As attorneys 
for involuntary clients,. their fees may properly be 
less than those they could have received by entering 
the marketplace and selling their services to the 
private client who would.make the highest bid for them [at 1338-39 J. · ·· 
;1 Plaintiffs' cost bill includes some $19,000 claimed as 
~ j 
Ji 
1 attorneys' fees (items 5, 6, 8). Fees related to the trial in 
.i 
li 
:1 this Court are claimed in a lump sum of $4,386 (item 5), w,ith no 
ij 
'I 
ii 
:i t; 
'i 
'I 
·! 
hourly breakdown or separation between in- and out-of-court time. 
The remaining part is billed at a straight $75 per hour for both 
Mr. Plater and Mr. Doughtery, although the cases are clear that 
·; such procedure is improper. ~' Copeland v. Marshall, 594 
F.2d 244, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1978); McCormick v. Attala Cty, Bd. of 
" Educ. , supra. 
II 
The burden is, of course, on plaintiffs to demon-
I! il strate the time spent and other factors ~hat would aid the court 
>I 
li 
:I in deciding the reasonable amount they are due. Richardson v. ,, 
•I 
/1 Communications Workers, 530 F. 2d 126,, 133 (8th Cir. ) , cert. 
II lj denied, 429 U.S. 824 ( 197 6); · 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
I, 
j\ and Procedure § 2675 (1973 & Supp. 1977). Yet plaintiffs have 
I
ll 
11 
wholly failed to provide the Court with the detailed breakdown 
I' 
rl of information a.bout the attorneys f activities .which is needed ji 
li 
I! to make an award. ,, Copeland v. Marshall, supra at 251. 4 
I i! 
4 One good example of the need for care in the reviewing of 
plaintiffs' claimed costs de~ls with airfare. They claim a 
total of $753.51 for two trips to Cincinnati in 1976 (item 7). 
The commercial round trip fare then from Knoxville was $76. 
Similarly $300 is claimed for transportation to the Supreme 
Court argument (item 10); the round trip fare at the time was $122. 
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1\ 
.I 
!i 
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II In TVA's opinion, even if the time claimed was estab-
/; 
I
I lished, the requested fee. is excessive. 
1/ this Court should consider in setting a reasonable fee are the 
Among the factors which 
li 
IJ 
" II )l if 
.,, 
[', 
following:. 
(1) At the time of the trial, and th"e initial briefing 
!j in 
It 
the Sixth Circuit, plaintiff Plater was employed full time 
ll 
,I 
:' as a salaried professor at the School of Law of The University !1 
:t 
!! of Tennessee. ,. He was also paid by the University for other i) 
il II assignments or research work during t~e 1975-76 school year. 
II d i! 
II 
1/ ), 
I' 1:· 
il 
\ ~ 
if 
II 
! 
then began teaching at Wayne State University Law School, another 
tax-supported institution. It is in major part for his time, as 
an attorney for himself and the other plaintiffs, for which 
recovery at $75 per hour is claimed. 
(2) Trial time is traditionally billed at a higher 
( rate than time spent in brief writing or investigation, research, 
It 
" ]! 
:I 
'I I! 
n 
:I 
II I! 
!I il 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
\i 
1! 
II 
l! 
'I 
II 
\f 
II 
I 
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II 
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!l 
\) 
I· 
:! 
~ I 
il 
lr 
!! 
!I 
i· II 
'I 
!i 
li 
i' 
J! 
depositions, and other pretrial work. As the Court knows, the 
facts were not in serious dispute. See pretrial order at 2-3; 
order of April 23, 1976. The trial of the t' snail darter" case 
lasted three days. There were also three "court days" involved 
with the appeal: One wAs a 45-minute argument in Akron, Ohio, 
on August 6, 1976, involving a stay of the injunction pending 
appeal granted by Judge Weick. 5 There was also an approximate 
total of two to three hours of or.al 'argument involved with the 
appeals to the Sixth Circuit -(on October 14, 1976) and the 
Supreme Court (on April 18, 1978). 
(3) Congress has established hourly rates of compen-
sation for lawyers appointed to represent criminal defendants 
under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1976). 
5 18.5 total hours are ctaimed for this argument (cost bill, item 6), which resulted in a substantial limitation .in TVA's favor of the injunction which Judge Weick had previously issued ex parte~ , That limitation was not disturbed by the Sixth Circuit's judgment, or by the Supreme Court's. 
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ji The basic compensation under that act is "a rate not, exceeding 
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$30 per hour for time expended in court or before a United 
States magistrate and $20 per hour for time reasonably expended 
out of court," which may be changed by the Judicial Council of 
the Circuit. The Sixth Circuit has not made a change. 
(4) On April 2, 1979, the Administrative Office of 
;; the United States Courts amended its Regulations and Procedures 
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)i for Payment of. Compensation and Expenses of Land Commissioners, 
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thereby authorizing district courts .to fix the rate of compensa-· 
tion for commissioners in condemnation cases at a maximum of $40 
per hour, but no more than $182.72 per day. 
(5) The claimed $75 per hour rate is on the very high 
ii side of the normal range of fees charged for legal work in this 
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area for the time period involved. The bulk of the legal work 
in this case was performed in 1976 during trial and appeal to 
the Sixth Circuit, although the Supreme Court briefing extended 
into the spring of 1978. This year, Mr. Dougherty's firm entered 
:: into a contract with TVA to provide professional legal services 
ti ll 
,, in connection with public hearings to be held under the Public 
I Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 at the rate of $60 per 
r hour, including secretarial costs and overhead. 
I (6) Fees set by other courts may be of some help to 
I the Court. While we have no way of .~comparing relative fee 
~ levels in other jurisdiction$, several cases have referred to 
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1/ the hourly fees they have considered reasonable in arriving at 
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an overall fee award, considering other relevant factors. Thus, 
in McCormick v. Attala Cty. ~d. of Educ., 424 F. Supp. 1382 
(N.D. Miss. 1976), the court stated that it was "well settled in 
this district that $40 an hour is a reasonable fee for services 
rendered in court and $25 an hour is reasonable for time neces-
H :: sarily expended by counsel out of court in preparation for the 
! 
;j easel! (at 1387-88). Similarly, in Willett v. Chester Water 
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